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OWOLABI V. AIR FRANCE AND MOSES V. AIR AFRIQUE-
DISTRICT COURTS DENY RELIEF TO PLAINTIFFS




THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT ("FSIA")
provides the exclusive basis for obtaining subject matter ju-
risdiction over claims against foreign states brought in United
States courts.' Under the FSIA, foreign states are immune from
the jurisdiction of United States courts unless the claims against
them fall under one of the Act's enumerated exceptions.2 The
Act also provides immunity to "agenclies] or instrumentalit[ies]
of a foreign state."3 Corporations are protected if a foreign
state's government or a political subdivision of the government
owns a majority of the company's shares. Key to our discussion
here, this definition includes airlines if a majority of the stock is
held by the government, allowing some airlines to be judgment-
proof in situations where they exhibit egregious tortious
conduct.4
The exception to the FSIA that is most frequently invoked by
plaintiffs is the "commercial activity" exception. 5 It was in-
tended to provide a framework for the courts in differentiating
between public acts and private ones. The former would have
immunity while the latter would fall under this exception.6 The
commercial activity exception allows for a suit when the action is
based either: 1) upon a commercial activity carried on in the
I See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610-11 (1992).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
3 Id. at § 1603(a).
4 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976).
5 See Sunil R. Harjani, Litigating Claims over Foreign Government-Owned Corpora-
tions under the Commercial Activities Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 181, 182 (1999).
6 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976).
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United States by a foreign state; 2) upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity else-
where; or 3) upon an act outside the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that activity has a direct effect in the United States.7 The
first clause of the commercial activity exception is the most fre-
quently litigated clause in the context of commercial aviation.
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia-Misunderstood Precedent
The Supreme Court laid out a three-part test to determine if
an activity falls within the first clause of the commercial activity
exception in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.' The Court stated, "[f] or
there to be jurisdiction in this case. . . [the] action must be
'based upon' some 'commercial activity' by petitioners that had
'substantial contact' with the United States within the meaning
of the Act."9 The Court also interpreted the meaning of "based
upon" as it is used in the FSIA in Nelson.' ° The Court held that
the commercial activities must involve "elements of a claim that,
if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief under his theory of
the case."'" The application of this definition by lower courts to
cases involving government-owned corporations has produced
results that are not in keeping with the stated purpose of the
commercial activity exception.
In Nelson, agents of Saudi Arabia hired the plaintiff in the
United States to monitor the safety of a hospital in Saudi Ara-
bia.12 After complaining about several safety violations the
plaintiff had witnessed, he was arrested, imprisoned for 39 days,
and tortured.13 He brought suit for failure to warn of the
hazards of reporting what he had seen, as well as the intentional
torts involved in his wrongful arrest, detention, and torture. 4
The Court characterized the basis of the claim as the police bru-
tality he suffered after his arrest rather than his contractual rela-
tionship with the hospital. Although the Saudi Arabian
7 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).
8 507 U.S. 349 (1993); see also AlexanderJ. Mueller, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and
the Need for a Human Rights Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 87, 95 (2000).
9 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356.
10 Id.
1 Id. at 357.
1' Id. at 352.
13 Id. at 352-53.
14 Jd. at 353-54.
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government's behavior was unconscionable, the Court charac-
terized police action as an act that is uniquely sovereign in na-
ture.' 5 Because the act underlying the suit in Nelson was
sovereign in nature rather than commercial, the claims could
not be brought under the commercial activity exception. The
Court further discussed the meaning of "based upon," and con-
cluded that for purposes of the FSIA, it required "more than a
mere connection with, or relation to, a commercial activity. '"16
The Court also discussed what differentiates a sovereign activ-
ity from a commercial one. A foreign state engages in commer-
cial activity, as opposed to sovereign activity, when it acts in the
manner of a private player in the market. 7 Furthermore, the
question of whether a state acts as a private player in the market
is determined by the behavior of the actor, not the motivation
behind it. For example, when a foreign state contracts to
purchase munitions for its army, the activity is commercial in
nature rather than sovereign because the action of contracting
is commercial, and the motivations for the contract are deemed
irrelevant for this analysis.'I In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
the Supreme Court made it clear that whether a state acts "in
the manner of a private party is a question of behavior, not moti-
vation." 9 Furthermore,
[B]ecause the Act provides that the commercial character of an
act is to be determined by reference to its "nature" rather than its
"purpose," the question is not whether the foreign government is
acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling
uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the
particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the
motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce. '0
Nelson is generally assumed to have narrowed the application
of the first clause of the commercial activity exception.2' But
Nelson is clearly differentiable from cases involving state-owned
corporations. The Court made it clear that the holding in Nel-
son was limited to situations in which the activity upon which the
15 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361.
16 Id. at 358.
17 Id. at 360.
I See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976).
19 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
20 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360-61 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504
U.S. 607, 610-11 (1992)).
21 Harjani, supra note 5, at 191.
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claim was based was purely sovereign in nature.22 After applying
the private act/public act analysis to cases involving govern-
ment-owned airlines, it becomes clear that virtually every action
undertaken by them should fall under the aegis of the commer-
cial activity exception. No action undertaken by an airline is
uniquely sovereign in nature. The more narrow construction
that has followed Nelson results in inequity in the legal system by
denying compensation to those who have been harmed by these
foreign entities.
Owolabi v. Air France and Moses v. Air Afrique-
Misinterpretation at Its Worst
Mary Owolabi purchased tickets to travel to Lagos, Nigeria at
Air France's office in New York City. 23 At the time she purchased
her tickets, Ms. Owolabi informed an Air France employee that
she was blind and would need a wheelchair and assistance at the
airport. She was informed that Air France would provide the
assistance she required. 4 Upon arrival in Lagos, she was helped
to an Air France office while her grandson went to meet rela-
tives at the baggage claim area, where she was to join him.25 Ms.
Owolabi was stranded in the office for more than an hour while
the employee who was to take her to baggage claim remained
absent. When he returned, her requests to be taken to the bag-
gage claim area were still denied because the elevator was bro-
ken. When she asked for help to walk to baggage claim, that
request was also denied.2 6 The total amount of time she was
delayed in the office is not specified in the case.
Ms. Owolabi's return trip to New York was no less eventful.
When her plane arrived at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris, an
Air France attendant once again assisted Ms. Owolabi through
the airport.27 She asserted that the assistant was "very rough in
handling the wheelchair," and ignored her requests to slow
down.28 She was left alone by the attendant for an hour after
her meal and was then assisted to a "noisy thoroughfare" where
she was left alone for seven hours. 29 Ms. Owolabi made several
2 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358 n.4.
23 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000).
2,1 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at *5.
27 Id. at *6.
28 Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *6-7.
29 Id. at *7.
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pleas for help, and ultimately urinated on herself 3 0 She was
eventually moved and someone asked for her traveling papers.
No one told her where she was going, although she asked sev-
eral times. She was ultimately placed on a Delta flight to New
York.3
In Moses v. Air Afrique,32 three Air Afrique ground crew mem-
bers in Dakar, Senegal accosted Mr. Uwazurike when he failed
to comply with their demands for $58.00 in "excess luggage
charge [s] ."' He was beaten, his luggage was ransacked, and his
passport and wallet were stolen.34 He returned to New York
shortly thereafter to seek medical treatment for his injuries.33
Both Ms. Owolabi and Mr. Uwazurike brought suit pro se
against the airlines upon their return to the United States. Ms.
Owolabi brought claims alleging discrimination on the basis of
her disability, age discrimination, racial discrimination, inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence,
and assault and battery.36 Mr. Uwazurike brought claims of as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, wrongful conversion, and negligent failure to
train and supervise its employees against Air Afrique. 7
Both Ms. Owolabi and Mr. Uwazurike argued that the respec-
tive airline's immunity was abrogated by the "commercial activ-
ity" exception. In both cases, only the first clause of the
exception was held to be applicable. 3' After analyzing the ele-
ments of each claim brought by the plaintiffs using the Nelson
precedent, the Owolabi and Moses courts determined which of
those claims related to the commercial activity of the defendants
in the United States-selling airline tickets and providing air
transport.4" Because proving the elements of intentional tort
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 2000 WL 306853 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2000).
31 Id. at *1.
34 Id.
35 Id.
'6 Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *8-9. Ms. Owolabi also brought suit
for damages from the delayed arrival of a freezer she shipped from the United
States, a claim that is irrelevant to this discussion. Id. at *6.
37 Moses, 2000 WL 396853, at *1.
38 Id. at *2; Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *26.
39 Moses, 2000 WL 306853, at *3; Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *26-
27.
40 Moses, 2000 WL 306583, at *3; Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *26-
2001] 1303
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN) COMMERCE
claims would not involve proof of the underlying commercial
activity, the intentional tort claims of both plaintiffs were
dismissed.41
The negligence claims were another matter. In Moses, the
court held Uwazurike's claim of negligent supervision and train-
ing to be merely a restatement of the intentional tort claims
against Air Afrique, and dismissed the claim as a "semantic
ploy. '4 2 The court stated "Uwazurike... may not circumvent Air
Afrique's immunity by re-characterizing his intentional tort
claims as negligent failure to supervise and train employees."43
The court based its decision upon a similar situation faced by
the Supreme Court in Nelson. In Nelson, the Court explained "a
plaintiff could recast virtually any claim of intentional tort com-
mitted by sovereign act as a claim of failure to warn, simply by
charging the defendant with an obligation to announce its own
tortious propensity before indulging it. ''44 But in Nelson, the
Court held that there was no "commercial activity" for a negli-
gent act to be based upon, making all of the claims in that case
uniquely sovereign in nature and differentiating the Supreme
Court's holding from the Moses result.4"
The court in Owolabi treated the negligence claims differently,
holding that a claim for negligence requires that the plaintiff
show that the defendant owed a cognizable duty of care, which
would require proof of the commercial activity in the United
States.46 Therefore, Air France was not found to be immune to
the negligence claim.47 To prove the elements of that claim, Ms.
Owolabi would have to show that a contract was entered into in
the United States. That contract would provide a link to the
41commercial activity of Air France in the United States.
The courts in Owolabi and Moses both wrongly rely on Nelson as
the basis for their holdings. While it is logical to extend the
definition of "based upon" from Nelson to other cases, it is not
logical to apply that definition in a way that undermines the very
41 Moses, 2000 WL 306583, at *3; Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *28-
30.
42 Moses, 2000 WL 306853, at *4.
43 Jd.
44 Id. (citing Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363).
45 See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358 (stating that for purposes of the FSIA, the mean-
ing of "based upon" requires "more than a mere connection with, or relation to,
a commercial activity").
46 Owolabi, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208, at *28.
47 Id. at *31.
48 Id.
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purpose of the commercial activity exception. Applying the def-
inition to cases involving government-owned corporations that
act as private players in the market inevitably leads to such an
unreasonable result.
CONCLUSION
The FSIA was written to provide for sovereign immunity in
cases involving a foreign state's public acts but not in cases based
on commercial or private acts.49 The commercial activity excep-
tion was intended to "prevent sovereign states from taking ref-
uge behind their sovereignty when they act as market
participants. '50 When a foreign sovereign owns a commercial
venture, its immunity extends to cover the commercial venture
in cases in which the venture would not otherwise have been
protected. While the commercial activity exception does allow
some claims to be brought against these "foreign instrumentali-
ties," cases like Owolabi and Moses go too far by construing the
exception narrowly based upon a misinterpretation of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Nelson. A more appropriate interpre-
tation, given the purpose of the legislation and the role of our
tort system, would deny jurisdiction only for those actions that
are uniquely sovereign in nature. To do otherwise is to deny
justice to United States citizens injured by these foreign corpora-
tions' unconscionable behavior.
49 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976).
5o Nelson, 507 U.S. at 368 (White, J., concurring).
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